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Private Eyes Watching You:
Google Street View and the Right to an
Inviolate Personality
Roger C. Geissler*
Google’s rollout of its Street View service in North America in 2007 provoked little
concern about the privacy implications of private homes and individuals being easily
viewed by potentially millions of persons. In contrast, Street View’s reception in
Europe, particularly in Germany, has been marked by episodes of both public outrage
and government concern. These divergent reactions can be explained in part by
differing conceptions of the right to privacy—with European concepts of privacy based
generally on the notion that an individual’s “dignity” should be protected—and the
differing levels of protection afforded by those conceptions to aspects of a person’s
identity.
This Note compares the legal protections afforded to individuals’ privacy in the U.S.
and in Germany. In particular, this Note looks at the concept of the right to an
“inviolate personality” that pervades privacy protection in Germany. This Note argues
that such a right can be found in U.S. privacy jurisprudence, and that this right protects
persons against the actions of private as well as government agents. Lastly, this Note
argues that privacy rights must be defined broadly in an era when Street View is
expanding to cover not just public streets and alleys, but also the interiors of museums
and even places of business.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012. I would like to
thank Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat for invaluable discussions that helped me formulate my initial
interest in this topic. I would also like to give thanks to Kathleen for her incredible support and
patience during long stretches while I was researching and writing this Note, and to Liam and Declan
for reminding me to also take time to play.

[897]

Geissler_63-HLJ-897 (Do Not Delete)

898

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

3/26/2012 5:36 PM

[Vol. 63:897

Table of Contents
Introduction................................................................................................ 898
I. Private Eyes: Street View’s Intimate Imagery ............................... 901
II. Privacy and Google Street View in the U.S. ................................. 904
A. Litigation Against Street View............................................ 904
B. Definitions of Privacy: Responses to Technological
Advances ................................................................................... 908
C. U.S. Constitutional Bases for a Right to Privacy ........... 911
D. Proposals for a “Privacy Bill of Rights” .......................... 914
III. German Privacy Rights: Protection for the Inviolate
Personality ........................................................................................... 917
IV. An International Approach to Protecting Privacy Rights........ 922
Conclusion .................................................................................................. 925

Introduction
The 2006 German film Das Leben der Anderen [The Lives of
Others] portrays the dehumanizing effects of an all-pervasive state
1
security apparatus on a citizenry that knows no privacy. It tells the story
of an East German playwright, Georg Dreyman, who becomes subject to
intense surveillance by the detested Stasi, or secret police, when he is
suspected of turning against the regime. After placing microphones and
training cameras in and around his apartment to monitor his movements,
Stasi agents recorded the minutia of Dreyman’s most mundane activities
in painfully detailed dossiers that remained classified until after the
German Democratic Republic vanished in 1990. This depiction of a
totalitarian government spying on its citizens resonated widely with the
German public: after fifteen months in German theaters, over two
2
million people had seen the film, which grossed over nineteen million
3
euros. In April 2007 it won in seven categories, including best film, of
4
the Deutscher Filmpreis, Germany’s equivalent of the Oscar.
The specter of the Stasi haunted Europe again in 2010. Only this
time, the menace was not German police-spies but legions of nondescript
vehicles with roof-mounted cameras deployed to photograph ordinary

1. Das Leben der Anderen (Buena Vista Pictures 2006).
2. Data Base on Admissions of Films Released in Europe, Lumiere, http://lumiere.obs.coe.int/
web/film_info/?id=26055 (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
3. Box Office/Business for The Lives of Others, Internet Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com/
title/tt0405094/business (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
4. Preisträger 2006, Deutscher Filmpreis, http://www.deutscher-filmpreis.de/archiv/20052010/2006/deutscher-filmpreis-2006/preistraeger-2006.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
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avenues and alleys. And unlike the snooping of the Cold War era, these
cameras were not in the service of a proletarian dictatorship, but a
5
Silicon Valley corporation recently valued at $192 billion. Google’s
Street View service is a feature of Google Maps and displays a 360degree street-level panorama of a given point on a map, including
whatever and whomever happened to be caught on camera at the instant
the photos were taken. In Europe, the presence of the Google Street
View cameras was met with a degree of resistance that was almost
entirely absent when it was first introduced in the U.S. in May 2007. In
the United Kingdom, residents of a Buckinghamshire village formed a
human chain to keep one of Google’s cars from taking pictures of their
6
homes. In Greece and the Czech Republic, the Hellenic Data Protection
Authority and the Office for Personal Data Protection, respectively,
forbid Google from taking any further images while they investigate
7
possible privacy violations.
But nowhere has resistance to Street View been as widespread as in
Germany in the months leading up to the nationwide launch of the
service on November 18, 2010. State and federal politicians accused
Google of flouting privacy laws. One member of the Hamburg city
8
government temporarily brought Street View to a halt worldwide. The
president of a national association of homeowners called for a law
requiring Google to obtain permission from each owner of every private
9
house visible on Street View. An editorial in a national newspaper
stated that the “Stasi would be green with envy” if it possessed the data
about people that Google does, and proclaimed that “the surveillance
10
state was yesterday, today it’s Street View.”
Street View has aroused far less opposition in Google’s native U.S.,
although concern has been mounting. The first voices of opposition came

5. Reuven Brenner, Putting a Value on Google and Facebook, Forbes Blog (Feb. 3, 2011, 3:13
PM), http://blogs.forbes.com/leapfrogging/2011/02/03/putting-a-value-on-google-and-facebook/.
6. Robert Hardman, A Very English Revolt Sees Off Google’s Spies, Daily Mail (U.K.) (last
updated Apr. 6, 2009, 8:06 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1167211/ROBERTHARDMAN-A-English-revolt-sees-Googles-spies.html.
7. Google Street View Blacked Out in Greece, CNN World (May 13, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/
2009-05-13/world/greece.google.street.view.blocked_1_google-earth-search-giant-google-maps?_s=
PM:WORLD; Ian Willoughby, Google Street View Cameras Infringe on Privacy, Says Czech Data
Protection Agency, Český Rozhlas (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/
google-street-view-cameras-infringe-on-privacy-says-czech-data-protection-agency.
8. Matthias Popien & Ulf B. Christen, Caspar Bremst Google aus—und Zwar Weltweit,
Hamburger Abendblatt (Ger.), May 27, 2010, at S12.
9. Lucas Wiegelmann, Hauseigentümer Fordern Gesetze Gegen Google, Die Welt (Ger.) (Feb.
8, 2010), http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/webwelt/article6306988/Hauseigentuemer-fordern-Gesetzegegen-Google.html.
10. Berthold Kohler, Editorial, “Street View” Statt “Schnüffelstaat,” Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung (Ger.) (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.faz.net/s/Rub7FC5BF30C45B402F96E964EF8CE790E1/
Doc~E864171A4747944449D1C4DF8CABD4A3E~ATpl~Ecommon~Sspezial.html.
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less than a week after Street View was launched, when the New York
Times interviewed the resident of an apartment building in Oakland,
California, who expressed dismay that her cat was clearly visible through
11
her living room window on Street View. The issue, she explained, is that
the line separating “public photos” from “peeping” has gotten blurrier
12
with Street View. More recently, a Pennsylvania couple brought suit
against Google for invasion of privacy, and a class-action suit is currently
13
pending in the District Court for the Northern District of California.
This Note considers the privacy issues that Street View has raised in
the U.S. in the broader context of the reactions in other countries,
specifically Germany. It also considers the recent revelations that Google
has used its fleet of Street View vehicles to collect personal data about
private citizens. This Note will recommend that the data-protection
legislation proposed by Senators Kerry and McCain should include
stringent privacy safeguards to reflect the common law and constitutional
assurances of an “inviolate personality.” This Note proposes that the
data-collection aspect of Street View cannot be considered in isolation
from its image-gathering and image-distribution aspects.
This Note is divided into four parts. Part I demonstrates how Street
View’s technology has compromised privacy since its introduction in
2007. Part II discusses the right to privacy in the U.S. as it has been
applied to Street View thus far. It begins by looking at litigation in the
U.S. against Street View. It then examines the ways in which the
definition of privacy has expanded to meet the novel situations that
technological innovations have brought about since the late nineteenth
century, and argues that a competing concept of privacy rights, expressed
as the right to control information about oneself, is too limited. It then
looks at the bases under the U.S. Constitution for a right to privacy and
argues that a right to an “inviolate personality,” or the “right to be let
alone,” is one of the fundamental rights implicit in that document. Next,
it considers the calls in the Senate and by the Department of Commerce
for a “Privacy Bill of Rights.” Part III compares American privacy
concepts with the more vigorous privacy protections afforded to
residents of Germany and analyzes recent litigation in Germany against
Street View. Part IV proposes that U.S. lawmakers consider broader
international trends in privacy protection because the traditional concept
of a “privacy tort” is too limited to adequately redress the harm that can
arise from the use of rapidly changing technology. It proposes
technological solutions that nongovernmental entities such as Google can

11. Miguel Helft, Google Zooms in Too Close for Some, N.Y. Times (June 1, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/01/technology/01private.html?_r=1.
12. Id.
13. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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implement to reduce their exposure to expensive litigation and to respect
American and European norms of privacy.

I. Private Eyes: Street View’s Intimate Imagery
It would not be a stretch to say that Street View’s cameras have
caught some people in situations in which they might have preferred not
to be photographed. In one of the more notorious early images available
on Street View, one man in San Francisco was seen scaling the gates of
14
an apartment building. Speculation as to his intent ranged from a
burglary in progress to a resident trying to enter his own apartment after
15
losing his keys. Many more instances of unambiguously legal behavior
have been recorded by Google’s cameras and made available to millions
of Internet users. Another infamous image in Street View’s first days was
16
of two women sunbathing on Stanford University’s campus. Debate on
a Stanford blog captured both sides of the privacy implications of such an
image being taken and made widely available: One student commented
that if the women truly were concerned about their privacy, they would
not sunbathe in swimsuits in a park where any number of passersby
17
might see them, while the blog’s author and another commenter opined
that the students “probably wouldn’t be too happy that anyone with an
18
Internet connection could see” them. Because anyone with an Internet
connection could view this image so easily, “the photo [was] being
viewed in the tens of thousands of times each and every day often with
19
not so innocent intent.”
While these two photos have since been removed from Street View,
many others have been posted. A quick Internet search shows many
websites dedicated to collecting images that might be embarrassing to
those captured by Street View. Media throughout the world also have
featured such photos. One mother in Northern England told the
Manchester Evening News that she “just felt sick to [her] stomach” when
saw a picture on Street View of her three-year-old son playing naked in
his grandmother’s yard on a hot day: “I’m angry, disgusted and upset
20
about it,” she said. One man in Finland was seen in his backyard,

14. S. James Snyder, Google Maps: An Invasion of Privacy?, Time Mag. (June 12, 2007),
http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1630926_1379845,00.html.
15. Id.
16. Joshua Glenn, Sunbathers and Jaywalkers, Where RU?, Bos. Globe Brainiac Blog (June 1,
2007, 9:04 AM), http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/brainiac/2007/06/sunbathers_and.html.
17. Christian, Google Street View Attacks Stanford Students’ Privacy?, Unofficial Stan. Blog
(June 1, 2007, 1:25 PM), http://tusb.stanford.edu/2007/06/google_street_view_attacks_stu.html.
18.. Id.
19. W., Google Street View Attacks Stanford Students’ Privacy?, Unofficial Stan. Blog (Aug. 28,
2008, 3:45 PM), http://tusb.stanford.edu/2007/06/google_street_view_attacks_stu.html.
20. Alice McKeegan, Mum’s Outrage over Picture of Naked Son on Google Street View,
Manchester Evening News (June 29, 2010), http://menmedia.co.uk/manchestereveningnews/news/s/
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behind a fence shielding his property from the street, with his genitals
21
exposed and his faced unblurred.
The foregoing examples illustrate that the manner in which Google
collects its images for Street View compromises privacy in a way that
ordinary people, even those who publish images on the Internet, cannot.
The Stanford image shows how a psychological barrier that might
ordinarily prevent someone from taking a photograph of sunbathers is
utterly absent in Street View. While it is undeniable that the students in
swimsuits were plainly visible in a public place, any person who might
have tried to photograph them from the sidewalk while standing still and
not seated in a car would have run the risk of being discovered by the
camera’s subjects or a passerby who could have objected. Instead,
Google collects images automatically from a camera mounted on a car;
the vehicle is not stationary, but instead moves along with the flow of
traffic. The image of the Stanford sunbathers could have been taken at a
22
speed of up to twenty-five miles per hour, which would not have alerted
them to the fact that they were being photographed, even if the camera
was visible to them. The fact that the images are taken mechanically
means that there is zero possibility that the picture-taker can exercise
discretion to refrain from taking a photo at an inappropriate moment.
Certainly there is no chance that the risk of social opprobrium would act
as a restraint on the photographer of two students enjoying the sun with
their backs turned toward the photographer.
The problematic Street View images from Europe demonstrate
another difference between Google and a casual observer on the street.
The cameras are mounted on Google’s vehicles at a height of
23
approximately 2.7 meters, or nearly nine feet. This vantage point allows
Google to peer over fences to photograph, for example, a child playing in
a yard or a man sunning himself behind his house—neither of which
would be visible to an ordinary person walking down the street.
Furthermore, Street View allows users to zoom in on images, enlarging
them to many times the size at which they are initially shown on Google
Maps. This permits users to view people clearly despite the distance that
otherwise would render the photographed subject indistinct to a casual
viewer—as if each image were taken with a telephoto lens. This feature
exemplifies the great distinction that exists between what is visible with
Street View and what is visible to an ordinary observer. It shows why the

1279455_mums_outrage_over_picture_of_naked_son_on_google_street_view?rss=yes.
21. Lester Haines, Street View Catches Finn with His Pants Down, Register (U.K.) (Feb. 11, 2010),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/02/11/street_view_finland/.
22. Stanford Univ. Parking & Transp. Servs., Conditions and Regulations for Driving,
Operating, Stopping, Standing and Parking of Motor Vehicles on Stanford University Grounds
§ SU-13 (2005).
23. See Willoughby, supra note 7.
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service cannot be considered to be capturing what any ordinary person
can see—all the more so because Google is constantly improving the
resolution of its images to replace older, fuzzier ones showing less
24
detail. Along with newer higher-resolution images, Google has recently
added tricycles to its fleet of camera-equipped vehicles, which according
to one Silicon Valley newspaper “will increasingly allow Google to
25
extend Street View beyond the public streets onto private property.”
While that article hastens to add that Street View might extend to private
26
property “if an owner [so] requests,” the facts in Boring v. Google,
discussed in Part II.A, demonstrate that a clear signal that a particular
property is private does not necessarily deter Google from capturing
27
images on that property. Even if Google’s tricycles were to stay entirely
on public property, its cameras (which capture images from seven feet off
the ground) likely will go to less-trafficked places where residents have a
28
heightened expectation of privacy.
Google claims that Street View shows what is visible when “driving
29
or walking down the street.” And in late 2009, Google CEO Eric
Schmidt explained that when it comes to Google’s ability to retain
information, “[i]f you have something that you don’t want anyone to
30
know, maybe you shouldn’t be doing it in the first place.” While this
might be true of clearly illicit behavior, it is a facile characterization of
privacy concerns. Any unobjectionable activity can take on an
unintended appearance once divorced from its context of time and place,
especially once it is visible not just to those in proximity to the activity,
31
but to Google Maps users worldwide. Moreover, few people stand nine
feet tall, and none has 360-degree vision. The fact that most Street View
imagery is created in a way that exceeds normal human capability thus
militates against the argument that no privacy concern is raised because
anything shown on Street View is what anybody else can see. Street View

24. See LadyBugz, Street View High Resolution vs. Lower Resolution, Google Earth Forum
(Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/earth/thread?tid=134bf23cf2c866f4&hl=en.
25. Google Street View Now Goes Places Cars Can’t, Palo Alto Blog (Mar. 1, 2011),
http://paloaltocal.com/google-street-view-now-goes-places-cars-cant.
26. Id.
27. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
28. Steve Mostyn, Google Improves Street View with Off-Road Tricycle Cameras, Tech Herald
(Mar. 11, 2011, 3:43 PM), http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/201109/6884/Google-improvesStreet-View-with-off-road-tricycle-cameras.
29. See Privacy, Google Maps, http://maps.google.com/help/maps/streetview/privacy.html (last
visited Feb. 14, 2012).
30. Richard Esguerra, Google CEO Eric Schmidt Dismisses the Importance of Privacy,
Electronic Frontier Found. (Dec. 10, 2009, 5:05 PM), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/12/googleceo-eric-schmidt-dismisses-privacy.
31. Dan Costa, Mayer Maps Out Google’s Coming Location Dominance at SXSW, PC Mag.
(Mar. 13, 2011, 1:15 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2381880,00.asp (stating that forty
percent of Google Maps users, or 150 million people, access the service using mobile devices).
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allows viewers to see far more than they possibly could otherwise in the
ordinary course of a day.
The possibilities for innocent activities to be misconstrued once
visible on Street View—bringing distress not only to the persons
photographed but also to others having dealings with them—were
illustrated in a complaint that Privacy International lodged with the
32
British government. Some two hundred Britons contacted the group
about problems that Street View had brought them. Among them was a
“married man . . . speaking at close proximity with a female colleague.
Because of nearby noisy road works he was forced to speak into her ear,
but the image created the appearance of intimacy. This image created a
33
tense argument between the married couple.” More disturbingly, a
woman who moved from house to house for several years to hide from a
violent ex-partner complained “that she felt extreme distress when Street
34
View identified her outside her new home.”
These examples show that it is no solution merely to refrain from
any activity we would not want anyone else to know about. It simply is
not possible to predict which one of our many activities might be
misconstrued when an image removes that action from its context or
when it might reveal sensitive information. Nor is it possible to rely on
Google’s face-blurring technology, which at the initial stage is done
automatically rather than by Google personnel, to conceal our
35
identities. Not only does this technology fail to blur faces over ten
36
percent of the time (even as it overzealously pixelated Colonel Sanders’
37
face at every KFC outlet in Britain), faces are just one of a person’s
many identifiers. Even if technology can successfully blur someone’s
face, their hair, body, and clothes remain distinctly visible and may reveal
their identity to others.

II. Privacy and Google Street View in the U.S.
A. Litigation Against Street View
Legal action in the U.S. against Street View has come exclusively
from private parties filing suit seeking a remedy for alleged harm that
Google caused. To date there have been very few complaints filed

32. PI Files Complaint About Google Street View, Privacy Int’l (Mar. 23, 2009),
https://www.privacyinternational.org/article/pi-files-complaint-about-google-street-view.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Andrea Frome et al., Large-Scale Privacy Protection in Google Street View 3–7 (2009).
36. Id.
37. Google Street View Blurs Face of Colonel Sanders at Every KFC, Telegraph (London) (May
20, 2009, 3:17 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/5356031/Google-Street-View-blursface-of-Colonel-Sanders-at-every-KFC.html.
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against Street View. In the 2008 case Boring v. Google, Inc., a couple
living in a suburb of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, sued Google for, inter alia,
38
invasion of privacy. The Borings alleged that the inclusion of “‘colored
imagery’ of their residence, outbuildings, and swimming pool” on Street
View—photographed “from a vehicle in their residence driveway”
located on a road that is “unpaved and clearly marked with ‘Private
Road’ and ‘No Trespassing’ signs,” “significantly disregarded [their]
39
privacy interests.” Regarding the claim for intrusion upon seclusion, the
district court stated that “[l]iability attaches only when the intrusion is
substantial and would be highly offensive to ‘the ordinary reasonable
40
person.’” While the court found it “easy to imagine that many whose
property appears on [Street View] resent the privacy implications” of
such public display, only “the most exquisitely sensitive . . . would suffer
41
shame or humiliation” from it. Mere inclusion of one’s home, even one
that is relatively secluded, did not, in the court’s view, establish that the
plaintiffs’ “alleged pain” and “suffering” at Google’s actions rose to the
42
level of being “highly offensive.” Accordingly, the district court granted
43
Google’s motion to dismiss.
The Third Circuit upheld the dismissal, noting that “[p]ublication is
not an element” of intrusion upon seclusion and that a court “must
examine the harm caused by the intrusion itself,” which in this case the
court found to be “arguably less intrusive” than if someone had knocked
44
on their front door. The court found it significant that the Borings were
not “themselves . . . viewed inside their home,” which is a “relevant
45
factor” in intrusion on seclusion claims. The only one of the Borings’
claims that the Third Circuit found had merit was their trespassing
46
claim. In late 2010, Google settled with the Borings, paying them one
47
dollar in compensation on that claim.
38. 598 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698 (W.D. Pa. 2009). The court clarified that the Borings’ “action for
invasion of privacy embraces four analytically distinct torts: (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) publicity
given to private life; (3) appropriation of name or likeness; and (4) publicity placing a person in a false
light.” Id. at 699. The tort intrusion upon seclusion “is established where a plaintiff is able to show:
(1) physical intrusion into a place where he has secluded himself; (2) use of the defendant's senses to
oversee or overhear the plaintiff's private affairs; or (3) some other form of investigation into or
examination of the plaintiff's private concerns.” Id. (quoting Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d
611, 621 (3d Cir. 1992)).
39. Id. at 699.
40. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Harris by Harris v. Easton Publ’g Co., 483 A.2d 1377, 1383–84
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)).
41. Id. at 700.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 698.
44. Boring v. Google, Inc., 362 F. App’x 273, 279 (3d Cir. 2010).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 283.
47. Chris Davies, Google Pays $1 Compensation in Street View Privacy Case, Slashgear.com (Dec.
3, 2010), http://www.slashgear.com/google-pays-1-compensation-in-street-view-privacy-case-03117450/.
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Currently pending in the District Court for the Northern District of
California is another suit, In re Google Street View Electronic
Communications Litigation, a class-action complaint involving allegations
of invasions of privacy far beyond Google’s gathering and dissemination
48
of images of private property. In May 2010, Google acknowledged that,
while the company was creating images with its camera-fitted cars, it had
“mistakenly collect[ed] samples of payload data from . . . non-password49
protected . . . WiFi networks” of private individuals. In October 2010
Google conceded that “entire emails and URLs were captured, as well as
50
passwords.” The plaintiffs claim that Google’s actions violated the
Wiretap Act, which prohibits the “[i]nterception and disclosure of wire,
51
oral, or electronic communications,” thus criminally invading the
52
plaintiffs’ “reasonable expectations of privacy.”
Technology has progressed in ways lawmakers could not have
contemplated when they enacted the privacy laws the plaintiffs relied
upon in these two cases. Congress passed the law at issue in In re Google
53
in 1968; the Borings alleged that Google violated the Pennsylvania
common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion in accordance with section
54
652B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, written in 1977. Neither
Congress nor the drafters of the Restatement (and common law courts
before them) could have anticipated a world in which images of places
and people could be retrieved almost instantaneously with a few clicks of
55
a mouse. By limiting the definition of privacy to the sense of seclusion
which can only be disturbed by someone being viewed in real time by a
person in close proximity to the person in seclusion, the Restatement
becomes too rigid to accommodate the technological innovations since
its drafting, especially those innovations of the last half-decade. Similarly,
the emphasis in the Wiretap Act on protecting the integrity of electronic
communications might not extend to now-common household realities,
such as private WiFi signals, which broadcast information about their
respective computer networks but which might not be considered

48. 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (N.D. Cal 2011).
49. See WiFi Data Collection: An Update, Official Google Blog (May 14, 2010, 1:44 PM),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/wifi-data-collection-update.html.
50. See Creating Stronger Privacy Controls Inside Google, Official Google Blog (Nov. 22, 2010,
12:00 PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/10/creating-stronger-privacy-controls.html.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2010).
52. In re Google Street View, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
54. Complaint, supra note 52, at 3 (referring to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977)).
See generally Pacitti v. Durr, 310 F. App’x 526 (3d Cir. 2009).
55. To give some idea of the state of technology at the time, computers manufactured in 1968 had
only alphanumeric displays and largely performed sophisticated mathematic calculations. A typical
example of a state of the art computer at that time is the Hewlett-Packard 9100, which cost $4,900 (the
equivalent of over $31,000 in 2011) and which was used almost exclusively for business applications.
For a brief description of the 9100, see http://www.hpmuseum.net/display_item.php?hw=50.
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“communication” in the sense that such information has no intended
56
recipient as initially contemplated by the Act.
The fact that the publication of images of one’s property or person
is not an element of a claim of intrusion upon seclusion indicates that
common law concepts of privacy are inadequate to grapple with the
reality that images can now be reproduced ad infinitum anywhere in the
world. Moreover, limiting the legal field to a tort of privacy for the
dissemination of personal images leaves open the possibility that only
those who possess a requisite knowledge of the latest technology would
know if they have been injured by such images. For example, Google
could capture an image of a person of “ordinary sensibility” who is
completely unfamiliar with technology and does not know about Street
View. Yet this person might find herself in a situation that causes her
mental suffering after someone else (such as her employer) sees the
image and acts upon it in some way, all without her ever knowing about
this image of her. Under the common law, an invasion of privacy claim
requires at a minimum that a plaintiff knows that the defendant viewed
57
her in a protected environment.
The common law tort of invasion of privacy is ineffective to protect
against an injury resulting from the wide dissemination of an image,
because that tort is concerned only with the moment at which an
58
individual is initially viewed. But with technologies like Street View, the
moment of being viewed necessarily occurs prior to—sometimes years
before—the dissemination of that image, without which the harm does
not occur. Criminal law also is inadequate to counter such an injury. For
example, the plaintiffs in In re Google allege that Google violated a
federal criminal statute that protects against deliberately intercepting
electronic communications. Apart from the issue of whether the
plaintiffs’ broadcast of non-password-protected data over WiFi
constitutes “communication,” a difficulty arises in determining whether
59
Google collected such data with the requisite knowledge of illegality.

56. In passing the Wiretap Act, Congress was concerned largely with preventing and punishing
eavesdropping, whereby an oral communication from one party to another party is intercepted by a
third party. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 801(a), Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82
Stat. 197, 211 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2010)) (“There has been extensive
wiretapping carried on without legal sanctions, and without the consent of any of the parties to the
conversation. Electronic, mechanical, and other intercepting devices are being used to overhear oral
conversations made in private, without the consent of any of the parties to such communications.”);
see also Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1540 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he legislative history of [the
Wiretap Act] evinces a congressional awareness of the widespread use of electronic eavesdropping in
domestic relations cases . . . .”).
57. Boring v. Google, Inc., 362 F. App’x 273, 279 (3d Cir. 2010).
58. Id.
59. See Fernicola v. Specific Real Prop. in Possession, No. 00-CIV-5173(MBM), 2001 WL
1658257, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2001).
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The debate surrounding Street View in Europe might provide a way
for courts and legislatures in the U.S. to safeguard against harms that
potentially invasive technologies such as Street View might cause. This
should be done without shifting the burden exclusively to private citizens
to protect their privacy, as under tort law. Such protection also should
avoid the potentially devastating costs on businesses that federal criminal
statutes would impose.
B. Definitions of Privacy: Responses to Technological Advances
Because there are a number of different concepts that can be
subsumed under the broad term “privacy,” it is first necessary to
determine which of these definitions is relevant to an analysis of Street
View. An early attempt to define privacy in the context of the
mechanical reproduction and dissemination of images of one’s person
appeared in 1890, in The Right to Privacy by Samuel Warren and Louis
60
Brandeis. There, Warren and Brandeis argued that the advent of new
technologies, which can create “instantaneous photographs,” permits the
“unauthorized circulation of portraits of private persons” by newspapers,
61
requiring legal recognition of “the right to be let alone.” This right to be
let alone was an extension of the common law right of the individual to
determine “to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions [were
62
to] be communicated to others.”
Another, more recent definition of privacy emerged in the context
of the dissemination of data about one’s person. Richard Posner
formulated this definition and noted that the word “privacy” can mean
63
“the withholding or concealment of information.” This, he argued, was
64
one of three possible meanings then in current use. Under Posner’s
understanding of privacy, a “right to be let alone” does not mean much,
65
because “[v]ery few people want to be let alone.” Indeed, the right to
privacy—which Posner described as “the right to control the flow of
66
information about” a person —has a downside in allowing people “to
manipulate the world around them by selective disclosure of facts about

60. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
61. Id. at 195.
62. Id. at 198.
63. Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 393, 393 (1978) [hereinafter Posner,
The Right of Privacy]. The other two definitions Posner advanced could be understood either as the
equivalent of “peace and quiet,” that is, the state that is disturbed when an unwanted telephone
solicitation “invades” one’s privacy, or as a synonym for “freedom and autonomy,” the meaning the
Supreme Court used in identifying a right to abortion as subsumed under a right to privacy. Richard
A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup. Ct. Rev. 173, 216; see
also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
64. Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 405, 405 (1981).
65. Posner, The Right of Privacy, supra note 63, at 400.
66. Id. at 395.
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67

themselves.” Information about others is not a final goal, but is instead
68
used as an instrument in the production of income. While individuals
should be assigned a property right in personal information, this right is a
69
byproduct of “socially productive activity.” The property right to
privacy should not extend to situations where there is “an element of
70
misrepresentation” in information one presents about oneself, because
such information has utilitarian value to others who have dealings with
that individual. Limiting the property right to privacy thus would reduce
71
transaction costs while also increasing efficiency.
Posner criticizes Warren and Brandeis’s argument for a “right to be
let alone” for being narrowly focused and little more than a “right not to
72
be talked about in a newspaper gossip column.” While Warren and
Brandeis did indeed deplore the increase of information available in the
73
press as a result of technological advances, Posner disagrees that such
74
media portrayals are little more than a result of “idle curiosity.” Rather,
he argues, “gossip columns” have a genuine utility: On the one hand,
they offer to ordinary persons information about “wealthy and successful
people” so that the former may model their own career and other
decisions on those portrayed in the media. On the other hand, gossip
columns also offer cautionary tales about “the pitfalls of success” so that
75
the readers presumably might avoid a similar fate. Posner claims that
76
“[p]eople are not given to random, undifferentiated curiosity.” Since
there is no risk of people randomly snooping into others’ affairs for no
77
purpose, a privacy concern does not exist.
Posner’s analysis regarding the utilitarian function of gossip media
may be less compelling now than when it was written in 1978. In 2011, it is
difficult to state, as Posner did, that “[g]ossip columns . . . are genuinely
78
informational.” However, Us magazine was founded just one year, and
People magazine four years, prior to the publication of Posner’s article.
Thirty-three years later, his position may be harder to defend, as a result

67. Id. at 400.
68. Id. at 394.
69. Id. at 403.
70. Id. at 414.
71. Id. at 397–99.
72. Id. at 406–07.
73. See Warren and Brandeis, supra note 60, at 195–96.
74. Posner, The Right of Privacy, supra note 63, at 396.
75. Id. This “patterning” function of gossip media explains why such media focus almost
exclusively on the wealthy rather than on the poor: because the latter by nature provide less useful
information for patterning our own lives. Whatever poor people are portrayed in gossip columns,
according to Posner, were once wealthy but became poor, thus such portrayals have a “cautionary
function” for an “ordinary person.” Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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of advances in technology that were practically undreamed of in the
1970s. Today’s gossip media constantly demands ever-new information
that might be of uncertain utility in “open[ing] people’s eyes to [new]
79
opportunities.”
Just as advances in communications have undermined Posner’s
claim of the ability of “gossip columns” to empower readers to make
well-informed life choices, so has such technology weakened his
argument that people do not engage in “random, undifferentiated
80
curiosity.” If this were still the case, then it is difficult to explain how the
website Chatroulette, which allows users to connect via webcam with
other, completely random users, could generate 3.9 million users just
81
four months after it launched. It is precisely the “random” quality of the
82
glimpses into others’ lives that thrills so many Chatroulette “voyeurs.”
This phenomenon makes Posner’s blanket denial of undifferentiated
interest in information about strangers difficult to support.
However, there are several arguments why interactions like those
on Chatroulette do not constitute an invasion of privacy. First, both
parties agree to each encounter by logging into the website and clicking a
button to be connected with another user on the network. Second, there
is a mutual exchange of images: every user that views another in an
intimate setting simultaneously and willingly broadcasts to that other
user a real-time image of herself as well; nobody is viewed unwillingly.
Lastly, there is almost complete anonymity on the website: nobody
knows the identity of the other party unless that party chooses to reveal
it, although users’ faces are generally plainly viewable to others (but not
83
always).
While indeed it does not make sense to agree to an invasion of
privacy, it cannot be the case, as Posner asserts, that random,
undifferentiated curiosity of others does not exist. It seems very likely
that users would be even more inclined to peep at others via webcam if
they did not have to reveal anything about themselves first. It might not
even matter to the user that the person viewed did not consent to, or was
even aware of, the fact that others were viewing an image of her.
Otherwise, there would have been no audience for a live streaming video
secretly taken by a Rutgers freshman of his roommate in an intimate

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Erick Schonfeld, Chatroulette Quadruples to 4 Million Visitors in February, TechCrunch.com
(Mar. 29, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/03/29/chatroulette-4-million-visitors.
82. Bobbie Johnson, Online Voyeurs Flock to the Random Thrills of Chatroulette, Guardian
(U.K.) (Feb. 13, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/feb/14/chatroulette-sex-voyeurswebsite.
83. Nick Bilton, The Surreal World of Chatroulette, N.Y. Times (Feb. 20, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/21/weekinreview/21bilton.html.
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encounter with another man. There, viewers were invited to participate
via an announcement on the freshman’s Twitter account, thereby
eliminating any anonymity that might have lessened the harm of the
85
filming and broadcasting.
C. U.S. Constitutional Bases for a Right to Privacy
86

A right to privacy is not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution.
Rather, a right to privacy may be inferred from the fact that the
Constitution limits government action in such a way that “guarantee[s]
that the individual, his personality, and those things stamped with his
87
personality” are free from “official interference.” The U.S. Supreme
Court did not address the issue of constitutional guarantees to privacy
until 1886, when it held in Boyd v. United States that “the very essence of
constitutional liberty” lies in an “indefeasible right of personal security,
88
personal liberty and private property.” In Boyd, the Court held that a
violation of the Fourth Amendment resulted when the government
attempted to compel petitioners to produce certain documents in
89
connection with an investigation into possible customs fraud. The
Court’s earliest jurisprudence on privacy was based on the inviolability of
private property. Because the documents the government sought were
the respondents’ “goods and chattels,” and thus their “dearest property,”
to compel their production to find evidence of wrongdoing violated the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and
90
seizures. This right in private property was construed very liberally. In
Boyd, the government sought the production of petitioners’ private papers
91
by court order. Yet that order was held to be unconstitutionally
“unreasonable search or seizure” even though petitioners and government
92
agents did not have to produce the documents.
Later, the Court stated in Gouled v. United States that the Fourth
93
Amendment was to be given a “liberal construction.” But despite the
technological advances that have given the government unprecedented
84. Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30,
2010, at A1.
85. Id.
86. William M. Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 212, 214.
87. Id.
88. 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
89. Id. at 638.
90. Id. at 627–28 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807); see also Adams v. New
York, 192 U.S. 585, 598 (1904) (“The security intended to be guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment
against wrongful search and seizures is designed to prevent violations of private security in person and
property and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home of the citizen.”).
91. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 618.
92. Id. at 639.
93. 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
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access into the private lives of its citizens, the Court has continued to
hold fast to a reading of the Fourth Amendment that was rooted in a
right to be secure in one’s tangible property. In Olmstead v. United
States, for example, the Court declared that Gouled’s liberal construction
could not mean that the Fourth Amendment extends beyond citizens’
94
“houses, persons, papers, and effects.” Accordingly, the Court in
Olmstead deemed wiretapped conversations obtained by the government
without a warrant to be admissible because the conversations were
95
recorded “without trespass upon any property of the defendants.”
In his dissent in Olmstead, Justice Brandeis echoed the themes of
invasion of privacy resulting from technological advances. Stating that
the majority opinion read the language of the Fourth Amendment too
narrowly, Justice Brandeis claimed that “[t]he makers of our
Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
96
happiness.” Instead of merely securing for citizens a right in “material
things,” the Framers “sought to protect Americans in . . . their thoughts,
97
their emotions and their sensations.” In essence, the Framers
“conferred . . . the right to be let alone,” which is “the most comprehensive
98
of rights and the right most valued by civilized [persons].” As a result,
Brandeis stated, the Fourth Amendment prohibits “every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,
99
whatever the means employed.”
By the time Boyd and Olmstead were overruled in 1967 by Warden
100
v. Hayden, the Court’s privacy jurisprudence had already strayed far
from the common law property right that formed the basis of the Boyd
decision. Justice Brennan stated in Hayden that the Court had
“recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment [was] the
101
protection of privacy rather than property.” The Court concluded that
because the Fourth Amendment protects only against unreasonable
“searches and seizures,” no generalized right to privacy can be found in
that provision alone—even if Boyd and Gouled can be read to imply such
102
a broad right. Indeed, that same year the Court stated in Katz v. United

94. 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
95. Id. at 457; see Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942) (finding no Fourth
Amendment violation despite government agents’ entry onto the defendants’ property to install a
“detectaphone” to listen in on phone conversations, and finding likewise that the use of the
“detectaphone” in an office adjoining that of the defendants was not unconstitutional), overruled by
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
96. 277 U.S. at 478.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
101. Id. at 304 (emphasis added).
102. Beaney, supra note 86, at 250.
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States that the “Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general
103
constitutional ‘right to privacy.’”
By the 1960s, the Constitution was read to include much more
104
privacy protection than just that of “material things.” In what might be
the most expansive enumeration of privacy rights the Court had ever
announced, Justice Douglas’ opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut stated
that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
105
emanations from those guarantees,” which “create zones of privacy.”
The right to marital privacy secured by Griswold was “created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees,” even if was not mentioned
106
explicitly in the Constitution, similar to the way the right of association
(also not mentioned in the Constitution) is guaranteed by the First
107
Amendment. Griswold and the cases it cites are but a few examples of
the Court’s movement away from a privacy right wedded to a common
law property right and toward a more comprehensive right. As Warren
and Brandeis expressed in 1890 and as Justice Douglas wrote over half a
century later, there is a right “to be let alone” that “draws substance
from several provisions of the Constitution, including the First, the
108
Fourth, and the Fifth Amendments.”
The Court has read an increasingly expansive right to privacy in the
Constitution, and it is difficult to imagine a turn of phrase as vague and
therefore as potentially all-encompassing as “emanations, formed from
penumbras.” However, the likelihood of the Court finding a general right
to privacy in the Constitution that would restrict the actions of private
entities is remote, even if such a right exists in other democratic
109
constitutions such as Germany’s. This is not to say that such a privacy
right does not exist, even if it is not explicit in the Constitution. Justice
Douglas described the “right to [be] let alone,” which he claimed
protects “the privacy of the home and the dignity of the individual,” by
protecting not only against intrusions by government agents such as
“lawless police” but also against private individuals such as Peeping
110
Toms. Under this rationale, while a Peeping Tom would not be
committing a constitutional violation per se, he unquestionably would
encroach on a person’s rights, and courts unquestionably would have the
power to punish him for violating a law rooted in the right to be let
alone.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
Id.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 483 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)).
William O. Douglas, The Right of the People 57–58 (1958).
See infra Part III.
Id. at 57–58, 95.
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D. Proposals for a “Privacy Bill of Rights”
The notion that a quasi-constitutional right to privacy or right to be
let alone could restrict the actions of private, nongovernmental entities
also has appeared in recent proposals in both the legislative and
executive branches. Recently, constitutional language has been used to
frame proposed legislation to respond to the fact that “modern
technology allows private entities to observe the activities and actions of
111
Americans on a scale previously unimaginable.” In December 2010, the
U.S. Department of Commerce released a report offering
recommendations for protecting consumers’ online privacy by “keep[ing]
112
pace with changes in technology, online services and Internet usage.”
The key recommendation in that report was the need for “the broad
adoption of comprehensive Fair Information Practice Principles
113
(“FIPPs”),” which were likened to a “Privacy Bill of Rights” for online
114
The FIPPs would promote “informed consent” by
consumers.
consumers, as well as “transparency through simple notices, clearly
articulated purposes for data collection, commitments to limit data uses
to fulfill these purposes, and expanded use of robust audit systems to
115
bolster accountability.”
The Department of Commerce noted, however, that the proposed
FIPPs do not involve a “full right to control” information about oneself.
Rather, the framework “articulates rights and obligations in personal
information, such as a right to access and correct information about
oneself and an obligation to use personal information only for specified
116
purposes.” In advocating for stronger informed-consent provisions, the
Department of Commerce invoked a concept of privacy closer to that
117
which Posner uses—the right to control information about oneself —
rather than Warren and Brandeis’s definition of privacy as the right of
the individual to determine “to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and
118
emotions shall be communicated to others.” This sense of privacy,
restricted to the control of personal information that is ultimately
analyzed and put to “economic use” by a third party, is as limited and

111. Kerry Urges Common Sense Commercial Privacy Protections, John Kerry (Mar. 16, 2011)
http://kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id=d18a9191-7fa3-437c-af24-3b6ca3a28f10 (emphasis added).
112. Commerce Department Unveils Policy Framework for Protecting Consumer Privacy Online
While Supporting Innovation, U.S. Dep’t Com. (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.commerce.gov/news/pressreleases/2010/12/16/commerce-department-unveils-policy-framework-protecting-consumer-priv.
113. Lawrence E. Strickling et al., Introduction to U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Commercial Data
Privacy and Innovation in the Internet Economy: A Dynamic Policy Framework vii (2010); id. at
23–29.
114. John Kerry, supra note 111.
115. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra note 113, at 4.
116. Id. at 10 n.17.
117. See Posner, The Right of Privacy, supra note 63, at 395.
118. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 60, at 198.
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unsatisfactory as Posner’s analysis. The Department of Commerce fails
to consider that such information can have no economic value in itself.
Yet the ability of such information to adversely impact a person if
120
communicated is real. A right to privacy cannot be limited to the
purely economic sphere. Here, it is worth repeating Justice Douglas’
words that a right to privacy also protects individuals from Peeping
121
Whatever the “benefits” that voyeurs derive from their
Toms.
voyeurism, presumably they are not economic in nature.
Calls for a “Privacy Bill of Rights” increased beginning in March
2011. At a hearing of the Senate Committee on Commerce, the White
House showed support for such a “Bill of Rights” when Lawrence
Strickling, the Administrator of the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, stated that “[t]he administration is now at
the point of recommending that this be dealt with in legislation,”
abandoning its earlier stance that data companies and advertises should
122
adopt voluntary codes of conduct. At the same time, Senators John
Kerry and John McCain announced their cooperation to create an online
“privacy bill of rights” that “should respect the consumers’ ability to
123
control the use of their personal information.”
The wording of such proposed legislation remains to be seen. If the
Department of Commerce’s report serves as a guide, however, the
approach likely will be one that seeks to empower consumers to have
some measure of control over any personal information that might have
economic potential. In doing so, the proposed legislation likely would be
too narrowly focused on the transmission of data to a limited number of
parties, such as advertisers, while ignoring the activities of Internet
companies like Google that make personal information widely available
to the broader public. Yet the recognition of a privacy right to
information about oneself must also be read to include images of oneself.
An image is data about a person: driver licenses, passports, employee
security badges, and gym membership cards all use photographs to
identify their owners because photographs corroborate other data about
the person. Google acknowledges as much by blurring faces of people
shown by Street View just like they do license plates, though it began to
do only after Street View had been available for almost a year, and only
124
in response to public complaints.
119. See supra Part II.B.
120. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra note 113, at 16.
121. See Douglas, supra note 108, at 95.
122. Diane Bartz, Obama Administration Seeks Internet Privacy Bill, Reuters (Mar. 16, 2011, 4:32
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/16/us-privacy-obama-idUSTRE72F83U20110316 (quoting
Lawrence Strickling, Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. Admin.).
123. Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Privacy Measure Draws Support, Wall St. J. (Mar. 17, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703899704576204932250006752.html.
124. See Stephen Shankland, Google Begins Blurring Faces on Street View, Cnet News (May 13,
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We have already seen how Warren and Brandeis argued that the
“latest advances in photographic art have rendered it possible to take
pictures surreptitiously,” so that doctrines of contract or privity could not
be applied to invasions of privacy occasioned by “the photographer, or
the possessor of any other modern device for recording or reproducing
125
scenes or sounds.” Accordingly, the fact that individuals whose images
are disseminated by Street View cannot consent to their images being so
used requires that privacy protection of a person’s image be more
forceful than protection of other types of personal data. Internet users
presumably set up accounts on Facebook and Gmail voluntarily and
agree, at least perfunctorily, to the terms of service, which may permit
126
the collection of personal data. Those whose identities are revealed on
Street View, however inadvertently, have no such opportunity. The
Department of Commerce recommendation that consumers be able to
“access” and “correct” personal data presumes that the consumers are
127
aware or informed that such information exists. As the Privacy
International report shows, “consumers” might not even know that
Street View has collected and made available data about them until their
128
identities have been compromised and the harm has been done.
It was against the invasive potential of “surreptitious” photography
that Warren and Brandeis advocated for a privacy right to protect the
dissemination of one’s image. The principle that protected against the
involuntary dissemination of one’s image, and indeed that had protected
a right to privacy at common law, was the “right to an inviolate
129
personality.” Another way to understand the concept of “inviolate
130
personality” is “human dignity and individuality” or an “individual’s
131
independence . . . and integrity.” The right to an inviolate personality
132
permits “the individual to do what he will.”
The right to an inviolate personality is the “common thread of
principle” that “runs through [privacy] tort cases, the criminal cases
involving the rule of exclusion under the Fourth Amendment, criminal
statutes prohibiting Peeping Toms, wiretapping, eavesdropping, the
possession of wiretapping and eavesdropping equipment, and criminal

2008, 10:01 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9943140-7.html.
125. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 60, at 211, 206.
126. See Google Terms of Service, Google, http://www.google.com/policies/terms/ (last visited Feb.
14, 2012); Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/legal/
terms?ref=pf (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
127. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra note 113, at 10 n.17.
128. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
129. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 60, at 211.
130. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,
39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 971, 991 (1964).
131. Id. at 971.
132. Id. at 1003.
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statutes or administrative regulations prohibiting the disclosure of
133
confidential information obtained by government agencies.” While an
“affront to dignity” can be “affected by physical interference with the
person,” it can also be “affected, among other means, by using
techniques of publicity to make a public spectacle of an otherwise private
134
life.” To be subject to “public scrutiny” is to be “deprived of [one’s]
135
individuality and human dignity.”
It remains to be seen if any proposed “Privacy Bill of Rights” would
include protections of a person’s right to dignity and would afford
protections to individuals to such an extent that it would not be left up to
each individual to police her own identity and image and assume the
burdens of bringing a tort claim against an alleged infringer. Other
democratic nations have been more vigorous and active in protecting
their citizens. France, for example, just days after the still-nebulous
“Privacy Bill of Rights” was floated before the Senate Commerce
Committee, fined Google 100,000 euros for improperly collecting
136
personal data from WiFi networks using its Street View cars. Because
Congressional and judicial action is still largely terra incognita with
regard to services like Street View, it is instructive to look to foreign
nations to see how they have enforced privacy protections, how they
have approached the issue of privacy violations occasioned by Street
View, and whether their approaches are applicable in the U.S. context. A
look at the debate surrounding Street View in Germany is particularly
illuminating because the debate there has been more vigorous than
perhaps anywhere else, and because it is a nation with a large portion of
137
Internet users—some seventy percent of the population.

III. German Privacy Rights: Protection for the
Inviolate Personality
As demonstrated, the U.S. Constitution affords protection to an
individual’s “inviolate personality,” even if such a right is not expressed
explicitly and must be inferred from provisions that were not part of the
original document. By contrast, the foundations of the German right to
privacy are found at the very beginning of the text of the German
138
constitution, or Grundgesetz (“Basic Law”). Article 2, section 1 of the
133. Id. at 1000–01.
134. Id. at 1003.
135. Id.
136. Greg Keller, France Fines Google over Street View Privacy Breach, Salon.com (Mar. 21, 2011,
2:19 PM), http://www.salon.com/2011/03/21/france_privacy_google_fined.
137. See Internet Usage in Germany Increases to Almost 70 Percent, Young Germany (July 1,
2009),
http://www.young-germany.de/nc/news-verwaltung/news-singleview/article/internet-usage-ingermany-increases-to-almost-70-percent.html?mobile=1&cHash=df398d653f3f3288b193ca12af6ca2e1.
138. Rosalind English, Protection of Privacy and Freedom of Speech in Germany, in Developing
Key Privacy Rights 77, 78–82 (Madeleine Colvin ed., 2000).
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Grundgesetz states, “Everyone has the right to the free development of
139
his personality,” while Article 1, section 1 protects “[t]he dignity of the
140
human being.” German courts have interpreted these two sentences in
case law to imply a right to privacy that not only encompasses an
affirmative government obligation to protect this right, but one that also
141
constrains private parties’ interactions with other private parties. The
prominent placement of guarantees of human dignity and liberty was a
conscious choice of the drafters of the Grundgesetz during the
constitutional convention of 1948, who sought to correct the flaws of
Germany’s previous constitution. The drafters considered that
document—in force from the founding of the Weimar Republic in 1919
until the defeat of the Third Reich in 1945—partly responsible for giving
142
the Nazis the ability to seize power.
The “right to the free development of one’s personality” clause in
Article 1 treats the right to privacy (Privatsphäre) as an integral part of a
143
person’s general personality right (allegemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht).
From a German perspective, it is not possible to distinguish “privacy”
144
from “personality.” Other aspects of the general personality right are
the individual sphere (Individualsphäre), which protects the personality
and the freedom of self-determination, and the intimate sphere
(Intimsphäre), which includes a person’s thoughts and emotions, their
various forms of expression, and all other aspects that require secrecy by
145
virtue of their nature. The intimate sphere is absolutely protected and
146
cannot be exposed to the public at all.
A further statutory protection of privacy is found in the
Kunsturhebergesetz (Act on the Author’s Rights in Respect of Artistic
Works and Photography), which provides protection against the
147
publication or dissemination of a person’s image. Section 22 of the
Kunsturhebergesetz states, “Images may only be disseminated or publicly
148
be presented with the approval of the person shown.” Approval is
deemed to have been granted if the person shown in the image received
149
consideration for the production of the image. The statute does not
139. Id. at 79.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Sabine Michalowski & Lorna Woods, German Constitutional Law: The Protection of
Civil Liberties 3–4 (1999). For the text of the Weimar Constitution, see Heinrich Oppenheimer, The
Constitution of the German Republic, at 219–58 (1923).
143. Thomas R. Klötzel, Privacy and Personality, in International Privacy, Publicity and
Personality Laws 157, 157 (Michael Henry ed., 2001).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 158.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 159.
148. Id. at 165.
149. Id.
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prohibit the taking of an image but only its dissemination and
publication, although case law has recognized that the act of taking a
picture itself can be considered a violation of the general personality
150
151
right. This statute covers any form of image of one or more persons.
It is necessary that the person shown can be recognized, but it is
sufficient if the individual can be identified by a small number of people
on the basis of certain elements such as appearance, haircut, clothing,
152
and so forth.
In Germany, only one case to date has been litigated regarding
alleged privacy violations occasioned by the imagery aspect of Street
View (as opposed to the surreptitious data-collection aspect). The
plaintiff, identified only as a woman in Berlin, was the owner of a single153
family house in a “quiet” neighborhood of other single-family houses.
She claimed that although photographs taken of a house from a public
street are not “objectionable,” it would be an infringement upon her
“personality” for a photograph to be taken of her property over a sixfoot-tall hedge, which would show her dwelling and possibly her and her
154
family. Accordingly, she sought to have her house omitted from the
155
Street View program. The Landgericht (Court of Appeal of the State of
Berlin) held, however, that she had no legal claim by which Google could
be enjoined from photographing her house—which Google had not yet
done—on account of injury to her “general personality right”
156
(allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts) under the Grundgesetz. The court
found the possibility too remote that Google would take images of her
house showing a detailed glimpse into its private areas, especially
because Google utilizes technology to render faces unrecognizable
157
through blurring. Moreover, the court found this possibility remote
because in Germany, Google allows homeowners and renters to request
that their buildings be hidden in Street View by a pixelated “curtain,”
which would allow the plaintiff to “secure her rights more quickly and
158
easily” than through an injunction.

150. Id.
151. Id. at 166.
152. Id.
153. Landgericht [LGZ] [Court of Appeal of the State of Berlin] Sept. 13, 2010, 37 LGZ 363/10,
available at http://www.berlin.de/sen/justiz/gerichte/kg/presse/archiv/20110315.1545.335632.html.
154. Kammergericht [OLGZ] [Supreme Court of the State of Berlin] Oct. 25, 2010, 10 OLGZ
127/10, available at http://www.berlin.de/sen/justiz/gerichte/kg/presse/archiv/20110315.1545.335632.html
(“Die Antragstellerin geht zutreffend davon aus, dass Aufnahmen eines Hauses von offener Straße
aus nicht zu beanstanden sind. Etwas anderes gilt nur, soweit Aufnahmen unter Überwindung einer
Umfriedung angefertigt werden und/oder die Wohnung zeigen, weil dies eine
Persönlichkeitsrechtverletzung darstellen kann.”).
155. Id.
156. 37 LGZ 363, at 6.
157. Id. at 3, 5.
158. Id. at 5 (“Damit kann der Betroffene, jedenfalls was die wesentlichen möglichen
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The court did, however, state that the plaintiff’s rights might be
implicated if she or her family actually were to be photographed on the
street or in their neighborhood, as this might constitute infringement of
159
section 22 of the Kunsturhebergesetz. However, the court stated that
while it was “theoretically conceivable that [the plaintiff and her family]
would be in the street at the moment the photograph was taken,” such an
event is only a “bare possibility” and “not particularly likely” because
the vehicle would pass by while taking photographs for “only a few
160
seconds.” The court considered the possibility of personal photographs
or otherwise impermissible images being disseminated on Street View to
be small, and the harm that such images would cause the plaintiff to be
161
less severe than the actual publication of improper photos. Thus, the
plaintiff was not entitled to a temporary restraining order or preliminary
162
injunction.
The Kammergericht (Supreme Court of the State of Berlin) upheld
163
this decision on October 25, 2010. Both of these rulings came just a few
164
months before Street View was launched in Germany. It was therefore
unclear whether the plaintiff’s house was even going to be shown in
Street View or what additional, personal aspects of her property or
private life would be shown on that service. As a result, the Landgericht
and the Kammergericht demonstrated skepticism about the privacy risks
that Street View posed and found that the only harm to the plaintiff was
purely speculative. Indeed, there could not have been any harm before
the images of German cities were made public, because whatever
damage might have been done to the plaintiff or others would have
arisen only when millions of Internet users could view them in private
moments.
As the complaints to Privacy International showed, the harm came
to persons captured by Street View only after the images were taken and
then made available to anyone in the world with an Internet

Verletzungshandlungen betrifft, seine Rechte auf andere Weise einfacher und schneller
durchsetzen.”).
159. Id. at 4.
160. Id. at 5.
161. Id. at 6.
162. Id.
163. Kammergericht [OLGZ] [Supreme Court of the State of Berlin] Oct. 25, 2010, 10 OLGZ
127/10, available at http://www.berlin.de/sen/justiz/gerichte/kg/presse/archiv/20110315.1545.335632.html.
164. These rulings, however, were not made public until Berlin’s city government issued a press
release on March 15, 2011, with the first media reports about the ruling coming one week after that.
Press Release, Kammergericht [Supreme Court of Berlin], Aufnahmen Eines Hauses für Google
Street View von der Offenen Straße aus Nicht zu Beanstanden (Mar. 15, 2011), available at
http://www.berlin.de/sen/justiz/gerichte/kg/presse/archiv/20110315.1545.335632.html; see also Jeremy
Kirk, Berlin Court Rules Street View Doesn’t Invade Privacy, PC World (Mar. 22, 2011, 7:40 AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/222805/berlin_court_rules_street_view_doesnt_invade_
privacy.html.
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connection—especially those who knew the people photographed. Had
the courts had the opportunity to witness Street View in operation, they
would have been able to see some of the images circulated in the press in
the days after its launch. These included a completely nude man in the
trunk of his car, which was parked in the driveway of his house in
165
a prostitute searching for customers on a street in
Mannheim;
166
Cologne; a prostitute in a Nuremburg brothel standing in a window at
the same level as the car-mounted camera and wearing only underwear
167
and a wristwatch; and a truck driver in Munich urinating by the side of
168
the road, with the truck’s license plate blurred but not the man’s face.
While the existence of images like these might not have led to a different
outcomes in the cases just discussed, the courts’ analyses of how the
service functions likely would have been different. Specifically, it would
have been difficult for the courts to say that the fact that Google’s photos
are taken from several meters above a car’s roof, and from the street as
opposed to the sidewalk, makes these photos less likely to infringe on
someone’s privacy. In fact, the cameras’ position is what has enabled the
169
photos described above to be so intrusive.
Because the Landgericht and the Kammergericht ruled only narrowly
170
that the plaintiff was not entitled to “preventative” relief, it remains to
be seen how a German court would consider allegations of actual harm
brought by people whose images were actually distributed via Street
View. For the time being, at least in Germany, the mere filming from the
street of publicly viewable buildings does not violate German privacy
laws. Nevertheless, Google in Germany recently acknowledged that it
does not intend to expand Street View beyond the twenty cities currently
available, nor will it take steps to update the imagery it currently has in
171
Germany. While Google gave no official reason for stopping further
Street View activities in Germany, one press source stated that it “cannot
be ruled out” that the “massive protests . . . have contributed” to this
decision, including the 244,000 requests Google received from people
172
who wanted their houses pixelated out of Google’s maps.

165. Huch, Was Hat den Google da Gefilmt?, Bild Zeitung (Ger.) (Nov. 20, 2010),
http://www.bild.de/BILD/news/leserreporter/aktuell/nachrichten/2010/11/19/google-street-view-fehler/
ungepixelte-menschen.html.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Landgericht [LGZ] [Court of Appeal of the State of Berlin] Sept. 13, 2010, 37 LGZ 363/10 5,
available at http://www.berlin.de/sen/justiz/gerichte/kg/presse/archiv/20110315.1545.335632.html.
170. Id. at 3.
171. Christian Fenselau, Keine Neuen Deutschen Städte in Google Street View, T-Online Blog
(Mar. 23, 2011, 2:08 PM), http://computer.t-online.de/google-street-view-keine-neuen-staedte-indeutschland/id_45187128/index?news.
172. Id.
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Google thus far has prevailed in litigation regarding the imagetaking and image-distribution aspects of Street View both in the U.S. and
in Germany. The limited scope of these decisions, however, means that
German and U.S. courts have yet to consider the issue of whether images
of a person, either on her own property or in the wider public, can
compromise a person’s identity and thus violate her expectations of
privacy once disseminated via Street View. In light of the statutory
language of the Kunsturhebergesetz, it is at least conceivable that a
German court could find that the distribution of images of persons in
public violates this law, especially in those cases where a person’s face
was not pixelated or where a person’s identity could be discerned from
other aspects of her physical appearance.
IV. An International Approach to Protecting Privacy Rights
There is a strong correlation between the degree of political and
economic freedom in a given country and whether images of that country
173
appear on Street View. A nation selected for inclusion in Street View
tends to be a multiparty democracy with a great amount of political and
174
press freedom. Nearly all countries in which Google has operated its
vehicles may be categorized as either a “full democracy” (with a
flourishing political culture and fully independent press) or a “flawed
democracy” (with free and fair elections but with some weaknesses,
175
although this category also includes democracies such as France.) Only
two countries—Hong Kong and Singapore—may be categorized as
having “hybrid” political systems (that is, lacking free elections or an
176
uncurbed press.) However, both of these nations enjoy a vast degree of
economic freedom, ranking by one measure first and second in the
177
world, respectively. No “authoritarian” countries (systems with little
political pluralism and a curtailed press) currently appear on Street
178
View.
It is difficult, therefore, to imagine a politically or economically
open society flatly prohibiting an entity like Google from creating maps
of its territory and enhancing those maps with detailed, visual, streetlevel data to enhance their utility. The large degree of openness in such
countries, with their attendant press freedoms, appears to be
173. A list of countries that currently appear on Street View may be found at Streetview Landing
Page Prototype, Google, http://gmaps-samples.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/streetview_landing/streetviewmap.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
174. For a ranking of countries by degree of political freedom, see Economist Intelligence Unit,
Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat 3–8 (Nov. 2010).
175. Id. at 31.
176. Id.
177. Heritage Found. & Wall St. J., Executive Highlights, in 2011 Index of Economic Freedom 6
(2011), available at http://www.heritage.org/index/PDF/2011/Index2011_ExecutiveHighlights.pdf.
178. Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 174, at 32.
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incompatible with government action that would obstruct the
dissemination of the sort of information Google provides. Even a
democratic nation with enormous security concerns, such as Israel, likely
will soon appear on Street View despite misgivings that such photos
179
might enable terrorist attacks.
But to allow an entity like Google to operate freely cannot mean
that it also should be allowed to provide its service absolutely unchecked.
Legislatures and courts must consider the countervailing forces of
political and economic liberty and the privacy interests of individuals in
light of rapid changes in technology. Otherwise, lawmakers would be
conceding the field of identity protection to a profit-driven organization
that might not share the privacy concerns of the broader public.
The more that technology operates at a supranational level,
allowing Internet users to access information from any place in the
world, the more U.S. lawmaking bodies must consider legal standards of
privacy protection being developed elsewhere. Failing to do so might
diminish the ability of U.S. companies to make their services accessible
to Internet users beyond the U.S., thus hindering companies’ global
reach even as they comply with domestic law. Congress should formulate
vigorous identity protections in light of developments abroad, but which
are based on our common law and constitutional precedents that respect
the right to an inviolate personality or the right to be let alone. Such
legislation would bring U.S. data-protection norms closer to those
currently enforced or likely to prevail in other open, democratic
societies, such as the recent European proposal for a “right to be
180
forgotten.” It also would help to ensure that the U.S. technology sector
retains the freedom to innovate—a freedom that has made services like
Street View indispensable throughout the world—while offering consumer
protections flexible enough to respond quickly to unanticipated challenges
that new technologies may engender.
As the statements of Senators Kerry and McCain and the
Department of Commerce’s report on data privacy indicate, the primary
concern of the U.S. government regarding Internet privacy is the security
of personal data transmitted to third parties, regardless of whether third
parties buy the information or obtain it for free. As discussed above,
however, a photograph of a person is data about that person just as much
as are an address or date of birth. Therefore, any data-protection
legislation Congress proposes to empower consumers to control the flow

179. Jessica Guynn, In Israel, Google Street View Is Seen as Possible Tool for Terrorists, L.A.
Times, Feb. 22, 2011, at 1; see also Chloe Albanesius, Google Street View Coming to Israel “Soon,”
Officials Say, PC Mag. (Feb. 22, 2011, 11:01 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2380709,00.asp.
180. Matt Warman, EU Proposes Online Right “to Be Forgotten,” Telegraph (London) (Nov. 5,
2010, 12:55 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet/8112702/EU-proposes-online-rightto-be-forgotten.html.
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of information about them must also include the ability to control the
transmission of an image of a person. The right to an inviolate
personality ought to form the basis of consumers’ ability to control
personal data, both because this right is so deeply embedded in
American jurisprudence and because traditional privacy torts are too
limited to respond to technology’s ever-improving ability to capture and
disseminate personal information efficiently.
As a global entity producing data accessible anywhere in the world
that has an unfettered Internet connection, Google must grapple with a
patchwork of privacy regimes throughout the world. However, Google
need not wait until Congress (or lawmaking bodies abroad) passes
statutes or regulations protecting an individual’s right to privacy before it
takes steps to remedy the grave privacy concerns about Street View that
have dogged it in the past. It could, for instance, implement technological
solutions for assuring that Street View does not distribute even partial
images of private individuals who may not wish to appear on the service.
One approach to this solution is the three-dimensional imagery
181
shown by the map service of Google’s Chinese counterpart, Baidu.
Users of Baidu’s maps have the ability to “swoop” over Chinese cities
and view detailed digital representations of almost every building in a
city, thereby allowing users to visualize a part of the city or a route
between two points even if they cannot view it from a street-level
182
perspective. The result of such purely digital imagery, however, is that
Baidu’s monochromatic cityscapes are disconcertingly devoid of any
people, cars, or activity. Accordingly, the advantages of actual streetlevel imagery for drivers or pedestrians navigating unfamiliar territory
are lacking because the maps do not render a true-to-life depiction of the
area.
But Google need not resort to such exclusively digital representations
to ensure that people’s identities are not compromised, particularly
because doing so would negate a large part of the functionality of Google
Maps. It could instead develop a technology to replace images of people
with renderings of unreal persons, created by digital artists, similar to
architectural renderings. Such a technology would eliminate the
possibility that a person’s identity could be divulged while also showing
scenes that might even be more representative of that particular place,

181. See Baidu, http://map.baidu.com/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
182. It is not clear why Baidu elected to show only three-dimensional representations of China’s
cities; one concern may be to avoid running afoul of Article 120 of the General Principles of Civil Law
of the People’s Republic of China, which provides that “[i]f a citizen’s right of personal name, portrait,
reputation or honour is infringed upon, he shall have the right to demand that the infringement be
stopped.” See General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Nat’l People’s Congress., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), available at http://en.chinacourt.org/
public/detail.php?id=2696.
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perhaps by varying the density of the crowds depending on the time of
183
day or by showing animations of a journey between points on a map.
Google could thus sidestep the need to respond to inconsistent and
unpredictable privacy regimes among different countries by digitally
altering Street View’s imagery to obviate any possibility of identifying
any persons who happen to be caught at that fraction of a second that
one of Google’s cameras releases its shutter as it rolls down a public
thoroughfare.

Conclusion
The reach of Street View has expanded far beyond the initial
concept seen in 2007, when Google added photographs of several U.S.
cities to its maps. If anything, the “street” part of the name is becoming
less and less accurate as Google makes available images taken from
184
railways in the Swiss Alps and even places with no paved roads like the
185
186
Amazon River and Antarctica. Street View also has made available
images from the inside of museums such as the Metropolitan Museum of
Art in New York City, the National Gallery in London, and the Hermitage
187
in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Most recently, Google announced a service
called Places that will show the interiors of businesses such as
188
restaurants, hotels, and fitness clubs. The more that Street View and
related services achieve a panopticon-like level of coverage of the globe,
the greater the likelihood that Google will capture and disseminate
images of persons who are engaging in certain activities precisely because
they had an expectation of privacy.
As images not only become more widely accessible over the
Internet, but also attain a permanent digital presence through caching
and archiving, the need to defend the right to an inviolate personality
grows more imperative. Rather than allowing the “right to be let alone”
to become something that a for-profit corporation may or may not
choose to grant, government entities must vigorously safeguard that right
for those who might wish to exercise it.

183. For an example of what digital simulations of persons and street life in an urban landscape might
look like, including movements of pedestrians, see Transbay Transit Center, http://transbaycenter.org/
(last visited Feb. 14, 2012), which depicts a mass-transit hub currently being constructed in downtown
San Francisco that is slated for completion in 2018.
184. Street View Hits the Stunning Swiss Alp Railways, Official Google Blog (Oct. 20, 2011, 7:00
AM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/10/street-view-hits-stunning-swiss-alps.html.
185. Juan Forero, Google Goes to the Amazon, Wash. Post, Oct. 18, 2011, at A8.
186. Sam Biddle, Google Street View Invades Antarctica, Gizmodo (Sept. 30, 2010, 7:20 PM),
http://gizmodo.com/5652406/google-street-view-invades-antarctica.
187. Nick Bilton, Google Takes Street View into Art Museums, N.Y. Times Bits (Feb. 2, 2011, 2:55
PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/google-takes-street-view-into-art-museums.
188. Dan Smith, Google Rolls Street View Indoors with Places, Wired UK (Oct. 31, 2011),
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2011-10/31/google-streetview-moves-indoors.
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